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Abstract
This article looks at the transition of the Habsburg South Slav lands, in particular Croatia,
from empire into (Yugoslav) nation-state from 1917 to 1923, and the violence which attended
it. While this transition was less cataclysmic in the South Slav lands than in other parts of
the former Habsburg Empire, patterns of paramilitary violence and counter-revolution similar
to those elsewhere in Europe were also present here. The article looks at these patterns from a
transnational perspective and shows that although state control was effectively restored in Croatia
by 1923, paramilitary networks forged during 1917–23 would return as Yugoslavia faced greater
external threats and internal disequilibrium in the 1930s.
The Croatian author Miroslav Krlezˇa wrote at the end of 1918 in the Croatian capital,
Zagreb, of his surprise at the rapidity of the Dual Monarchy’s demise: ‘A few days
ago Austria [sic] disappeared from our little town so nonchalantly that not one of our
many dear, respectable fellow-townspeople noticed that, in fact, among us, Austria
was no more.’1 Certainly the fall of the house of Habsburg was less apocalyptic
in the South Slav lands than in Austria itself, and post-imperial Croatia did not
convulse in revolution and violent counter-revolution as did Hungary. But neither
was the transition out of Austria-Hungary and into the Kingdom of Serbs, Croats and
Slovenes (hereafter Yugoslavia) as seamless or as pacific as Krlezˇa suggested. In fact,
the breakdown of imperial authority over the course of 1918 allowed for – and was
accelerated by – a state of apparent lawlessness in much of the Croatian hinterland,
as so-called ‘Green Cadres’ attacked the property of large landholders and refused to
go on contributing to the monarchy’s war effort. Attached to the Green Cadres were
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arguably more politicised groups of ‘returnees’ from revolutionary Russia, South
Slav soldiers who hoped to restage the Bolshevik revolution in the Habsburg lands of
central Europe. This unrest was in large part instigated and maintained by rank-and-
file South Slav soldiers of the Habsburg army, mainly peasant conscripts. However,
a smaller number of ex-Habsburg officers also saw this period of transition as an
opportunity to effect their own kind of revolution, similar in conception to those in
counter-revolutionary Hungary and Germany.
In order to understand fully the process of transition from empire to (Yugoslav)
nation-state and the violence which attended this process, it is necessary to look
beyond national boundaries and to consider this transition in a more general
context. Collapse of empire, revolution and counter-revolution were European-wide
phenomena during 1917–23, and they provided transnational networks, programmes
and ideologies for the groups considered below. As the revolutionary moment peaked
and then subsided in Europe, the efficacy of these groups also diminished, and was
ultimately circumscribed by a number of local factors. These included the military
superiority of the Serbian/Yugoslav army and the (short-term, at least) success of
this institution in integrating former Habsburg soldiers into its officer corps, the
effective policing of radical movements in Yugoslavia, and the mass popularity of
a pacifist, anti-militarist agrarian movement among Croats after 1918. Nevertheless,
this article will show that the violence of 1917–1923 would resurface, mutatis mutandis,
as Serb–Croat relations worsened in the 1930s. In order to understand that period
it is necessary to look at the violence, both actual and potential, of 1917–23. This
violence grew out of the First World War, and is closely connected to the experience
of South Slav soldiers in Habsburg uniform, the changing fortunes of the monarchy’s
war effort, and the changing attitudes of its South Slav soldiers.
Habsburg South Slavs during the war
From the outset of the war, Habsburg authorities seem to have been satisfied that
Croats, at least, would fight loyally and willingly for the monarchy. Although imperial
authorities had been concerned about the increasing attraction of the movement
for South Slav unification for the youth of Croatia, Dalmatia, and Bosnia and
Herzegovina, especially following the impressive victories of the Kingdom of Serbia
in the first and second Balkan wars,2 they were also relieved when the news of the
assassination of Archduke Franz Ferdinand in Sarajevo in June 1914 led to anti-Serb
riots and violence in a number of cities in Croatia and Bosnia.3
Once in Habsburg uniform, the experience of South Slavs was varied. Somewhat
paradoxically, the theatre in which South Slav soldiers experienced the fiercest
fighting, the Italian front, was also the theatre where they seem to have fought with
2 Mirjana Gross, ‘Nacionalne ideje studentske omladine u Hrvatskoj uoc´i svetskog rata’, Historijski
zbornik, XXI–XXII (1969), 75–143.
3 Robert J. Donia, Sarajevo: A Biography (London: Hurst: 2006), 123–6, and Andrej Mitrovic´, Serbia’s
Great War 1914–1918 (London: Hurst: 2007), 11–23.
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most determination.4 With the notable exception of the Slovene officer Ljudevit
Pivko and his co-ordinated desertion to the Italians and subsequent pro-Entente
propaganda work, South Slav soldiers – especially Croats and Slovenes – fought well
until the very end of the war, apparently concerned with defending their hearth from
widely known Italian territorial claims.5
The situation was more complicated on the Balkan front. Distinctions between
the South Slav nationalities were of particular consequence for Austria-Hungary
here, especially in ethnically heterogeneous areas such as Bosnia and Herzegovina.
As in Croatia, Austro-Hungarian authorities concluded that the biggest threat to
their authority came from ethnic Serbs. The governor-general of occupied Bosnia
and Herzegovina (and Dalmatia) from November 1914 onwards, the Croat officer
Stjepan Sarkotic´, saw no contradiction between working on behalf of the monarchy
and Croatian national interest in this region. Sarkotic´, like a number of high-ranking
Habsburg officers as well as an opposition party in the Croatian Sabor (Assembly)
known as the ‘Frankists’, hoped that by fighting loyally for the Habsburgs during the
war, Croats would be rewarded in a putative post-war reorganisation of the monarchy.
Sarkotic´ oversaw surveillance and punitive measures whose intention was to break
the Serbian nationalist movement, ensuring its unproblematic incorporation into the
monarchy after the war.
The implementation of this policy involved internment, mainly of ethnic Serbs,
but also of anti-monarchy Muslims and Croats, the organisation of paramilitary units
known as the Schutzkorps, comprising mainly Muslims, and trials of Serbian political,
cultural and ecclesiastical elites, culminating in the so-called ‘Banja Luka Trials’.6
Sarkotic´’s hostility to Serbian nationalism and his dual loyalty – to both Habsburg
and Croatian causes – are illustrative of the attitudes of a small section of the Croatian
elite within the monarchy, mainly Habsburg officers and pro-Habsburg ‘Frankist’
deputies in the Croatian wartime Sabor. They would come to play an important role
in attempts at counter-revolution during 1917–23.
In terms of understanding the ‘aftershocks’, violence and lack of order during
1917–1923, the Eastern Front is key. For a large number of soldiers on this front the
war was over by June 1916, when the success of the summer offensive of the Russian
general Alexei Brusilov resulted in the loss of almost a third of the Austro-Hungarian
army in the east, or 750,000 soldiers, including 380,000 prisoners of war.7 Ivo Banac
has calculated that of the 200,000 South Slav soldiers in Russian captivity over the
4 See, e.g., Richard B. Spence, ‘No troops displayed greater martial ardour against Italy than the
Yugoslavs’, in ‘Yugoslavs, the Austro-Hungarian Army, and the First World War’, doctoral dissertation,
University of California Santa Barbara, 1981, 95.
5 Mark Cornwall has found that of the seventy soldiers who crossed the line with Pivko in September
1917, most were either Serb or Czech. Mark Cornwall, The Undermining of Austria-Hungary: The Battle
for Hearts and Minds (Basingstoke: Macmillan, 2000), 133.
6 Vladimir C´orovic´, Crna knjiga patnje Srba Bosne i Hercegovine za vreme svjetskog rata (Belgrade: I. -D.
-Durąevic´, 1920), and Pero Slijepcˇevic´, ‘Bosna i Hercegovina u svetskom ratu’, in Napor Bosne i
Hercegovine za osloboąenje i ujedinjenje (Sarajevo: Izdanje Oblasnog odbora Narodne odbrane, 1929).
7 Gunther E. Rothenberg, The Army of Francis Joseph (West Lafayette, IN: Purdue University Press,
1976), 196.
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course of the war, some 80 per cent were from the countryside, that is to say, peasant
conscripts.8
Writing about the attitudes of these ‘rank and file’ soldiers in Russia and their
response to the revolutions is difficult, since they are not as historically visible as, say,
their officer counterparts. Yugoslav historiography since the Second World War, as
well as memoir literature (and even novels and films), has tended to emphasise in the
first place the number of South Slav soldiers who converted to communism before,
during or immediately after October 1917 (including, of course, Josip Broz ‘Tito’,
who had served as a non-commissioned officer in the Habsburg army).9 It is true
that a significant number of South Slav POWs were gravitating towards socialism in
the period after the February revolution and before the Bolshevik coup. Within the
South Slav volunteer division at Odessa, for example, a sizeable number of soldiers
had broken away from their commanding officers and created a ‘dissident movement’
(in March 1917) numbering 12,741 soldiers (and 149 officers).10 These soldiers formed
well-organised councils and agitated for socialist revolution, and included a number
of future luminaries of the Communist Party of Yugoslavia, such as Nikola Grulovic´,
Nikola Kovacˇevic´ and Vladimir C´opic´. Tito, a prisoner of war (POW) in Russia
at this time (although not associated with the volunteer movement), should also
be included in a small but noteworthy list of South Slavs who became committed,
life-long communists after spending time in revolutionary Russia.
The transformations in Russia at this time meant that Austria-Hungary would
now face a costly ‘aftershock’ of the 1916 Brusilov Offensive. All POWs in Russia
were freed by the Bolsheviks at the time of the revolution, including thousands of
South Slavs captured during Brusilov’s assault. From the beginning of spring 1918
these former soldiers started to arrive home, if not died-in-the-wool Bolsheviks,
then certainly unwilling to be re-mobilised into the imperial army. The actions of
these returnees were ultimately fatal to Austro-Hungarian authority in the region,
and contributed to an eruption of disorder and paramilitary violence towards the end
of 1918.
Nevertheless, the impact of the October Revolution in the region was not
immediate. Perhaps in the light of the unexpected Austro-Hungarian military success
in Caparetto towards in autumn 1917, reports from local authorities on the incidences
of resistance in the monarchy’s South Slav lands at the end of 1917 found nothing
8 Ivo Banac, ‘South Slav Prisoners of War in Revolutionary Russia’, in Peter Pastor and Samuel R.
Williamson Jr, eds., War and Society in East Central Europe, Vol. 5, Origins and Prisoners of War (New
York: Brooklyn College Press, 1983), 120.
9 On this topic see Banac, ‘South Slav Prisoners’; Ferdo Cˇulinovic´, Odjeci Oktobra u jugoslavenskim
krajevima (Zagreb: Izdavacˇko poduzec´e 27. Srpanj, 1957); Nikola Grulovic´, Jugosloveni u ratu i
Oktobarskoj revoluciji (Belgrade: Prosveta, 1962); Ivan Ocˇak, U borbi za ideje Oktobra: jugoslavenski
povratnici iz sovjetske Rusije (1918–1921) (Zagreb: Stvarnost,1976); Ocˇak, Jugoslavenski oktobarci: likovi
i sudbine (Zagreb: Sˇkolske knjiga, 1979); Ocˇak, Barabasˇ (Zagreb: Kajkavsko spravisˇcˇe, 1978); Ocˇak,
Vojnik revolucije: zˇivot i rad Vladimira C´opic´a (Zagreb: Spektar, 1980).
10 Banac, ‘South Slav Prisoners’, 131.
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worth noting.11 Imperial authorities, although strained, were still in control of the
situation. But in February 1918 a naval mutiny involving Czech and South Slav sailors
broke out on ships stationed at the Bay of Kotor (Cattaro).12 Close on the heels of
the sailors’ revolt came the return of POWs from revolutionary Russia, beginning in
March 1918. Nervous Austro-Hungarian authorities, concerned about a ‘red wave’
of Bolshevik agitation coming out of Russia, interned these ‘returnees’ as soon as
they crossed the monarchy’s frontiers, and held them in special screening camps. The
desire to end the war on the part of these men proved difficult to isolate and contain,
however. Soldiers who were returned to their units often had a corrosive effect on
morale, agitating for an immediate end to the fighting. Such agitation resulted in
more revolts in spring, this time at barracks in Styria (Judenburg) and Herzegovina
(Mostar).13
Many soldiers coming home from Russia simply refused to re-enlist in their
regiments. They had a very simple message for their fellow countrymen about what
they had seen during the revolution, as one peasant testified:
A soldier who returned from Russian captivity explained to us what the situation was in Russia.
He told us how the Tsar treated the people, how the people put down their weapons, fed up with
war and poverty . . . they told us how revolution had destroyed the old order and how the people
had decided that there would be no more war. They told us how the peasants and the workers
were now the rulers of Russia, and that there was no more war over there.14
It was this sort of attitude that provided the catalyst for the disorder which engulfed
the Croatian countryside in autumn 1918. The promise of ‘no more war’, brought
back from Russia by soldiers who had witnessed the revolution there, motivated
many peasants to join armed bands, or ‘Green Cadres’ in the Croatian countryside.15
As Richard Plaschka has noted in his discussion of conflicting ideological currents in
the Habsburg army during the war, Bolshevism appealed to soldiers first and foremost
because it promised to establish the socio-political conditions necessary to end the
exhaustion and material need caused by the war.16 Essentially, it promised to end the
war.
11 Croatian State Archives, Zagreb (Hrvatski drzˇavni arhiv, hereafter HDA), fond 78. ‘Predsednisˇtvo
Zemalske vlade’, box 923, no. 5868.
12 Cˇulinovic´, Odjeci, 188–243; Richard Georg Plaschka, Cattaro-Prag, Revolt und Revolution: Kriegsmarine
und Heer O¨sterreich-Ungarns im Feuer der Aufstandsbewegungen vom 1. Februar und 28. Oktober 1918 (Graz:
H. Bo¨hluas Nachf, 1963); Rothenberg, The Army of Francis Joseph, 211; Bernard Stulli, Revolucionarni
pokreti mornara 1918 (Zagreb: Institut za historiju radnicˇkog pokreta, 1968).
13 Z. A. . Zeman, The Break-up of the Habsburg Empire 1914–1918: A Study in National and Social Revolution
(London: Oxford University Press, 1961), 143, 163.
14 Cˇulinovic´, Odjeci, 108.
15 On the Green Cadres see Ivo Banac, ‘“Emperor Karl has become a Comitadji”: The Croatian
Disturbances of Autumn 1918’, Slavonic and Eastern European Review, 70, 2 (1992), 284–305; Cˇulinovic´,
Odjeci, 91–130; Bogdan Krizman, Raspad Austro-Ugarske i stvaranje jugoslavenske drzˇave (Zagreb: Sˇkolska
knjiga, 1977). For an interpretation of the disorder in the countryside at this time which dramatically
de-emphasises the scale and organisation of the Green Cadres, see Dinko Cˇutura, ‘Hrvatske postrojbe
u Prvom svjetskom ratu i vojni raspad Austro-Ugarske’, master’s thesis, University of Zagreb, 2003.
16 Richard Plaschka, ‘Contradicting Ideologies: The Pressure of Ideological Conflicts in the Austro-
Hungarian Army of World War One’, in Robert A. Kann, Be´la K. Kira´ly and Paul S. Fichtner, eds.,
254 Contemporary European History
Variations on the theme of ‘no more war’ can be found in reports from local
authorities in the monarchy’s South Slav lands throughout 1918. In Zemun in July,
for example, authorities reported on an encounter with a returnee who promised
that ‘of all those returning from Russian captivity, not a single [soldier] will fight on
the front, whichever front that may be’.17 In August, a peasant reported to authorities
in Osijek (Slavonia) on a meeting he had had with two armed members of the Green
Cadres. The men told him they were preparing a popular revolution similar to that
in Russia, and assured him they had the weapons and the numbers to do so.18
The National Council and the passage out of empire
When, in October 1918, the National Council of Serbs, Croats and Slovenes
was formed in Zagreb,19 the monarchy had already lost de facto control of the
region. However, the establishment of the National Council did not automatically
create a new source of legitimacy in the region. This was because the politicians
and intellectuals on the National Council were not at the vanguard of a popular
revolution. In terms of numbers and weapons, the deserters, returnees and peasants
who comprised the Green Cadres dwarfed the meagre forces of the National Council.
What, then, did these paramilitary groups want? Deserters and returnees, as we
have seen, wanted to opt out of fighting the war, that is to say, to avoid re-enlistment.
But by autumn 1918 this reluctance to fight on the part of peasants – the spark
which ignited the disorder – appears to have assumed a broader social revolutionary
platform, and was often directed at vestiges of the Habsburg ancien re´gime, and even
at authority per se. Targets of the Green Cadres included members of the nobility,
bureaucrats and large estates.20 The impotence of the National Council in the face of
this violence is reflected in the pronouncements and decisions taken during its short
lifespan. On the 29 October, for example, the day the Croatian Sabor severed all
links with the Habsburgs, the National Council also issued a plea to soldiers formerly
of the Austro-Hungarian army and the Green Cadres to submit to its authority and
to stop the destruction of property: ‘Don’t destroy, don’t burn down, don’t kill,
since you are destroying and burning that which is yours, soldiers!’21 Apparently in
response to attacks on large landholdings, the National Council even discussed and
then issued a proclamation promising a ‘democratic agrarian–political reform’ which
would liquidate the vestiges of feudalism in the Habsburg South Slav lands and would
redistribute land to the ‘broadest layers of the agricultural population’.22 (In the event,
The Habsburg Empire in World War One: Essays on the Intellectual, Military, Political, and Economic Aspects
of the Habsburg War Effort (New York: Boulder, Columbia University Press, 1977), 106–7.
17 HDA, fond 1363 ‘Politicˇka situacija’, box 3.
18 Ibid. See also Banac, ‘“Emperor Karl has become a Comitadji”’.
19 Ferdo Sˇisˇic´, Dokumenti o postanku Kraljevine Srba, Hrvata, i Slovenaca: 1914–1919 (Zagreb: Matica
hrvatska: 1920), 170.
20 Banac, ‘“Emperor Karl has become a Comitadji”’
21 Sˇisˇic´, Documenti, 211.
22 Ibid, 257. Selections of documents produced by the various departments of the National Council have
been published in the following volumes: Narodno vijec´e Slovenaca, Hrvata, i Srba u Zagrebu 1918–1919:
Izabrani dokumenti, chosen and arranged by Marina Sˇtambuk-Sˇkalic´ and Zlatko Matijevic´ (Zagreb:
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the issue of agrarian reform in Yugoslavia was not fully resolved even at the end of
the inter-war period.)
Even in Zagreb there existed resistance to the National Council. Just as the
experience of war had altered depending on when and where soldiers had fought and
which rank they held, the breakdown of military discipline and declining imperial and
rising national loyalties were not uniform among South Slavs. On the Italian Front,
for example, the crises of the hinterland corroded South Slav soldiers’ reliability
and willingness to fight for the monarchy more slowly than on other fronts.23 Stjepan
Sarkotic´ remained loyal to Austria-Hungary and its war effort until he received orders
directly from the Ministry of War in Vienna to hand over his troops to the Bosnian
National Council.24 Similarly, two Habsburg generals of Croat descent, Luka Sˇnjaric´
and Mihovil Mihaljevic´, were unwilling to put themselves and their forces at the
disposal of the National Council until they had received instructions to do so from
Emperor Karl himself, at Scho¨nbrunn palace.25
The changing state of imperial and national loyalties of men such as Sarkotic´,
Sˇnjaric´, Mihaljevic´ et al., not to mention the more immediate problem of the Green
Cadres, created an atmosphere of high tension in the National Council. For example,
the council ordered the train carrying Sarkotic´ to Zagreb in November 1918 to be
surrounded with armed guards. Uncertain as to what the general’s intentions in the
capital were, they detained him for ten days before letting him go into self-imposed
exile, initially to Graz.26 In similar fashion, the National Council panicked when
learning of the return to Zagreb of Antun Liposˇc´ak, the former governor-general
of occupied Poland. It was not convinced by the general’s note of 12 November,
welcoming the creation of ‘Great Yugoslavia’ and offering to put his soldiers at the
disposal of the National Council.27 It was believed instead that he intended, along
with a group of fellow officer co-conspirators, to overthrow the new regime in
Zagreb and replace it with a military dictatorship. The National Council arrested
Liposˇc´ak and a fellow conspirator on the night of 22 November, announcing the
next day that they had thwarted a plot involving ex-Habsburg officers throughout
the country. 28
The ‘Liposˇc´ak Affair’ also provided a pretext for the leading Croatian Serb
politician in the National Council, Svetozar Pribic´evic´, to press for unification with
the Kingdom of Serbia and with Montenegro (that is to say, to create Yugoslavia),
and to invite the Serbian army into the former Habsburg lands.29 The decision, taken
on the night of 24–25 November, was supported by an overwhelming majority in the
National Council, concerned with peasant unrest, pro-Habsburg elements and Italian
Hrvatski drzˇavniarhiv, 2008), and Milan Pojic´, ed., Vjesnik naredaba Odjela za narodnu obranu Vlade
Narodnog vijec´a Slovenaca, Hrvata, i Srba 1918–1919 (Zagreb: Hrvatski drzˇavniarhiv, 2008).
23 Cornwall, Undermining Austria-Hungary, 287–298.
24 Noel Malcolm, Bosnia: A Short History (London: Pan, 1996), 162.
25 Ferdo Cˇulinovic´, Jugoslavija izmedju dva rata, 2 vols. (Zagreb: Jugoslovenska akadamija znanosti i
umetnosti, 1961), 68–9.
26 Obzor, 8 November 1918.
27 HDA, fond 124,’Narodno vijecˇe SHS: Sekcija za organizaciju i agitaciju’, opcˇi spisi, box 9.
28 Obzor, 15 February 1919.
29 Tomislav Zorko, ‘Afera Liposˇc´ak’, Cˇaspois za suvremenu povijest, 35 (2003), 896.
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designs on the Adriatic littoral.30 Significantly, it was opposed by Croatian People’s
Peasant Party leader Stjepan Radic´,31 as well as by the pro-Habsburg ‘Frankists’, the
party which had organised anti-Serb riots after the Sarajevo attentat in 1914.32
The Serbian army in the former Habsburg lands
The Serbian army, on the back of liberating Serbia from Austro-Hungarian and
Bulgarian occupation, came to fill the power vacuum created by the disintegration
of Austro-Hungarian control of the region. Again, the different histories of the
Habsburg lands during the war inform the different responses to this event throughout
the Habsburg South Slav lands. For Bosnian Serbs, who had been out of favour
during the war, the Serbian army was considered an army of liberation, just as
it had been in Serbia. Less well-disposed towards the entrance of the army was
the Mulsim population of Bosnia and Herzegovina, targeted on account of their
collaboration, real or perceived, with the wartime regime. Peasant unrest similar
to that seen in Croatia and Slavonia assumed predominantly national contours, as
Serb peasants attacked Muslim landholders throughout the country.33 This violence
persisted after unification. In July 1920, for example, Bosnian Muslim leaders staged
a rally complaining that attacks on the Muslim population continued in the new
state, and that perpetrators of this violence had gone unpunished.34 But in Dalmatia,
under the same wartime occupation as Bosnia, the Serbian army was, at least initially,
welcomed by a large part of the population.35 Here, wartime hardship combined with
the real threat of Italian expansion, generated a pro-unitarist, pro-Yugoslav sentiment.
The most important zone of conflict and resistance to the Serbian army and its
efforts to gain control in the former Habsburg lands was the Croatian hinterland.
Two factors are crucial in this region. First, and most importantly, are the changes
in attitudes among the Croatian peasantry towards authority and centralised rule as a
result of the war and the deterioration and demise of the Habsburg empire. In this
sense, the period should be considered in terms of a process which began with the
degradation of Habsburg authority in spring 1918 and continued with the entrance
of the Serbian army at the end of the year. The new regime was struggling to impose
obligations on Croatian peasants, especially paying taxes and serving in the army,
which, as a result of the fall of the monarchy, came to be considered to be non-
binding. Second, and a corollary of this first point, are the attempts to capitalise on
30 Bogdan Krizman, Hrvatska u prvom svjetskom ratu: Hrvatsko-srpski politicˇki odnosi (Zagreb: Globus, 1989),
341–51.
31 Stjepan Radic´, ‘Govor na noc´noj sjednici Narodnog vijec´a (u Zagrebu, 24.11.1918)’, in Stjepan Radic´:
Politicˇki spisi, govori, i dokumenti (Zagreb: Znanje, 1995), 79–86.
32 The Frankists distributed leaflets after the unification (1 December) claiming that the National Council
had acted without the blessing of the Croatian people. See Cˇulinovic´, Jugoslavija izmeąu dva rata, I,
157–9.
33 Ivo Banac, The National Question in Yugoslavia: Origins, History, and Politics (Ithaca: Cornell University
Press, 1988), 367.
34 Archive of Yugoslavia (Arhiv Jugoslavije), Fond 14 ‘Ministarstvo unutrasˇnjih poslova’, facsimile 4,
no. 14.
35 Henry Baerlein, The Birth of Yugoslavia, Vol. 2 (London: Leonard Parsons, 1922), 35.
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this continued mood of resistance to authority by two groups: the small vanguard of
Bolshevik ‘returnees’ and their unsuccessful attempts to effect a socialist revolution
in the countryside, and the Croatian Peasant Party of Stjepan Radic´, who, with far
greater success, encouraged pacifist resistance and non-compliance towards the new
regime.
Regaining control in Croatia
Sources suggest that in Croatia the Serbian army quickly came to be perceived by the
local population as an occupying force. As the American observer Leroy King warned
in spring 1919, ‘The Serbian army is now scattered throughout Croatia; and there
have been many acts of “militarism” which the peasants do not like. Here in Agram
[Zagreb] one hears many expressions of dislike for the methods of the Serbian military
administration.’36 The potential for unrest among the Croatian peasantry continued
to be noted by the authorities. In August 1920, for example, a circular was despatched
from Zagreb throughout Croatia and Slavonia warning of the deterioration of public
security in Slavonia (especially Srijem) over the previous four to five months.37 The
circular advised the recruitment of local leaders, clergy and school teachers in a bid
to impress upon the population of these areas the need for improved security, which
was, after all, in the interests of everyone.38
In the official government and police records of the time the spectre of
communism looms large over the Croatian countryside. Here Yugoslav authorities
shared the concerns of their Habsburg predecessors. In June 1919, for example,
the gendarmerie chief reported that soldiers returning from Russian captivity were
spreading Bolshevism in the district and that in nearby Crkvenici, a similar ‘republican
spirit’ had been observed.39 In the army, short-lived revolts took place in barracks
in Maribor and Varazˇdin (22 and 23 July 1919 respectively). In Varazˇdin, the rebels
issued demands for a republic and for a ‘Yugoslav People’s Army’.40 There were reports
of a similar attempt at ‘Bolshevik insurrection’ in Osijek, which appeared to have
support from Be´la Kun’s Hungary. According to the authorities, it was a belief in
the arrival of ‘Red Guards’ from Hungary which had provoked the uprising, rather
than dissatisfaction with pay or living standards among soldiers.41 In Karlovac, also in
summer 1919, a commanding officer reported similar conditions in his battalion. A
group of ex-POWs were agitating among conscripts in order to spread Bolshevism;
he believed that conscripts would take heed of Bolshevik propaganda merely to escape
from their military duties. It was because of this unwillingness to serve in the army, he
felt, rather than for any ideological reasons, that Bolshevism presented a threat.42 This
36 ‘Leroy King’s Reports from Croatia March–May 1919’, Journal of Croatian Studies, 1 (1960), 85.
37 HDA, fond 1363, ‘Politicˇka situacija’, box 6.
38 Ibid.
39 Ibid.
40 Stanislava Koprivica-Ostric´, ‘Vojnicˇka pobuna u Varazˇdinu 23. VII 1919. godine’, Cˇasopis za
suvremennu povijest, 25 (1983), 85.
41 HDA, fond 78 ‘Predsjednisˇtvo zemalske vlade 1869–1921’, box 960.
42 Ibid.
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last point is of critical importance. The Yugoslav authorities were essentially facing
the same problem as the Habsburg authorities before them, albeit in very different
circumstances. After 1918, just as before, hostility to centralised authority per se and
protest against material hardship were the motivating factors for resistance, rather
than strong ideological convictions among the peasantry.
This is not to say that the Bolshevik threat was entirely a fantasy. A small but
well-organised vanguard comprising ex-soldiers (Serbs, Croats and Slovenes) worked
energetically in the period after the war to establish a Bolshevik party and network for
the purpose of socialist revolution, and their activities have been well documented in
the historiography.43 Ex-soldiers such as these found transnational allies and financial
backers in Be´la Kun’s short-lived Hungarian Soviet in 1919,44 and communists across
the country were successful in organising a national strike, also in 1919 (June).
Communism emerged as a movement with countrywide support in the elections
to the constitutional assembly in November 1920 (the only party with significant
support among more than one national group), having already received a majority
in municipal elections in Zagreb and in Belgrade, the two most important cities in
Yugoslavia.45
However, support for communism in the Croatian countryside was more
circumscribed than the authorities imagined. Exhaustion and an increasing
unwillingness to take up arms, part of the legacy of the war, meant that Bolshevik
‘returnees’ were swimming against the post-war tide at this time. Of far greater
resonance was Stjepan Radic´’s pacifist, anti-militarist message, encouraging peasants
to resist the new regime, just as they had the old. Radic´ appealed to peasants by
associating Yugoslavia with Austria-Hungary; both regimes had inflicted taxes and
conscription on the Croatian peasant. He interpreted the ‘occupation’ of the Croatian
countryside by the Serbian army at the end of 1918 as a return to the kind of
militarism which had been thoroughly discredited in the violence unleashed by the
war.46 Impressed by the threat of international communism, its successes elsewhere in
central Europe and the memory of the role played by ‘returnees’ in the Green Cadres,
the authorities were unable, or unwilling, to draw a clear distinction between Radic´’s
anti-militarist message and Bolshevism. The two terms are often used interchangeably
in the sources, as has been shown. Peasant violence and resistance in the Croatian
countryside, then, peaked in the last days of the war and then subsided (but did not
disappear) with the end of the war and the arrival of the Serbian army. Unrest here
was closely linked to peasant attitudes towards centralised authority, a relationship that
43 Ivan Ocˇak, ‘Povratnici iz sovjetske Rusije u borbi za stvaranje ilegalnih komunisticˇkih organizacija
uocˇi prvog kongresa SRPJ (k)’, Historijski zbornik, XXVII (1974–5), 1–26; also Ivo Banac, ‘The
Communist Party of Yugoslavia During the Period of Legality 1919–1921’, in Bela K. Kiraly, ed.,
War and Society in East Central Europe, Vol. 13: The Effects of the World War One: The Rise of Communist
Parties (New York: Brooklyn College Press), 188–212.
44 Ivan Ramljak, ‘Afera Diamenstein’, in Zdravko Drazˇina, ed., Zagreb jucˇer, danas, sutra (Zagreb: Epoha,
1965), 207–17.
45 Results of the elections for the constituent assembly are given in Banac, National Question, 388–9.
46 Ivan Muzˇic´, Stjepan Radic´ u Kraljevini Srba, Hrvata, i Slovenaca (Zagreb: Hrvatske knjizˇevno drusˇtvo
sv. C´irila i Metoda, 1987) 39.
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had transformed dramatically as a result of the war. It was precisely this unwillingness
to co-operate with Habsburg authorities which led to an unwillingness to co-operate
with Yugoslav authorities after 1918.
The Croatian counter-revolution
Paradoxically, it was a continued commitment to wartime goals that led to a small
group of ex-Habsburg officers and ‘Frankists’ to organise an unsuccessful rebellion
against Yugoslavia in the same period. We have seen that the National Council in
Zagreb was anxious about a Kornilov-style military coup at the end of the war,
taking no chances with returning generals such as Sarkotic´ and Liposˇc´ak. In fact,
outside observers had also warned that ex-Habsburg officers of Croat descent such
as these might try to resist the new order, especially after unification with Serbia
and Montenegro on 1 December. The US lieutenant Leroy King and the British
major Arthur Temperley, both in Zagreb in spring 1919, reported as such to their
respective governments. Under the heading ‘The Reactionaries and Discontented’,
King placed ‘ex-officers of the Austrian army (Yugoslavs by blood) who have been
retired because of their leanings to the old regime’, adding that such officers ‘spread
pessimism and are ready to urge discontent’.47
I can imagine what the ex-Austrian officers, who glare at one from the cafes, must say about the
Serbs. This growing unpopularity of the Serbian army will easily be transformed into dislike of
the Serbian people and influence. It is a dislike which already exists to some extent, and Major
Temperley agrees with me in thinking it a real danger.48
For his part, Major Temperley counted thirty-six retired generals and ‘500 staff or
field officers’ in the neighbourhood of Zagreb, and concluded that ‘generally speaking
the officers are a more active body of discontented persons than the nobles’.49
Indeed, a plot involving ex-Habsburg officers and Frankist e´migre´s and the
formation of a ‘Croatian Committee’ and a ‘Croatian Legion’ were eventually
uncovered by Yugoslav authorities over the course of 1919–20. The exact details
of this plot are still unclear.50 The Croatian Committee was established in summer
1919 precisely for the purpose of effecting the kind of anti-Yugoslav revolution
the authorities feared. The Croatian Committee was a paramilitary group, or at least
aspired to be a paramilitary group, comprising ex-Habsburg officers and POWs (from
Italian captivity) and based, eventually, in Miklo´s Horthy’s Hungary. According to
one source, the Croatian Committee started out as a propaganda council, with
the intention of calling for the withdrawal of the Serbian army from Croatia,
followed by free elections. This course of action had been decided in Austria at
47 ‘Leroy King’s Reports’, 83–4.
48 Ibid., 85.
49 The National Archive, Kew (TNA), PRO/FO371/3508, ‘The Political Situation in Croatia – 31st
March 1919’.
50 Banac, National Question, 264, and Bosiljka Janjatovic´, Politicˇki terror u Hrvatskoj 1918–1935 (Zagreb:
Hrvatski institut za povijest, 2002) 196.
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some point in 1919, following a meeting between several ex-Habsburg officers.51
These e´migre´s maintained contacts with Habsburg legitimists in Hungary and with
the Italian ambassador in Vienna,52 both parties having an interest in using the Croats
to undermine the new Yugoslav regime.
The formation of a Croatian Legion, a volunteer force based in Hungary (Koszeg,
and then later Zalaegerszeg), was announced by the Committee in November 1919.53
Its chief recruiter was Stipe Duic´, a former lieutenant-colonel in the monarchy’s army
and a Habsburg legitimist.54 He was allowed by the Italian government to tour their
POW camps garnering support for the Committee’s cause.55 In their propaganda the
committee boasted of 300,000 soldiers, although this was certainly an exaggeration
designed to boost support.56 The authorities in Belgrade and in Zagreb were aware
of the activities of the two bodies from a very early stage.57 They supplied a figure
derived from ‘various sources’ of 250 officers, with a further fifty ‘higher officers’,
also noting the support of Hungarian legitimists and the existence of a spy network
in Vojvodina (Novi Sad).58 In a letter addressed to a Croatian Peasant Party deputy,
Vladko Macˇek, and reprinted in Belgrade’s Politika newspaper, Vladimir Sachs, a
Croatian Committee member and Frankist, suggested that the actual total was nearer
to 100 men.59
Presuming that Sachs’s figure is closest to the truth, the Croatian paramilitary
counter-revolution was far smaller than its counterparts in Hungary, Austria and
Germany. It seems likely that these e´migre´s were counting on a number of other
factors which might offset their lack of manpower, a consideration which has thus
far not been noted in the historiography of the legion. Widespread discontent in
Croatia at the unification was taken for granted by the e´migre´s. More specifically, it
was felt that disgruntled Croatian officers and soldiers serving in the newly formed
Yugoslav army would support any putative uprising against the Serbs (this assumption
was made repeatedly by the Croatian radical right in the inter-war period).
Even more important for this group of officers and would-be militants was
the example set by other paramilitary groups in Europe, such as the Freikorps in
Germany, Gabriel D’Annunzio’s volunteer army in Fiume (Rijeka), the Szeged
counter-revolutionaries in Hungary and the Austrian Heimwehr. For each of these
groups the armistice of 1918 marked a new stage in the war, rather than its cessation.
They provided a context and a precedent for the Croatian e´migre´s, and examples
of the Croatian Committee seeking allies or co-operating with like-minded parties
51 According to the account of committee member turned Yugoslav police informant Emanuel Gagliardi,
Istina o hrvatskom emigrantskom revolucionarnom komitetu 1919–1921 (n.p., 1922).
52 Vuk Vinaver, Jugoslavija i Maąarska 1918–1933 (Belgrade: Institut za savremenu istoriju, 1971), 120.
53 Banac, National Question, 264.
54 For information on Duic´ see Stjepan Matkovic´, ‘Zˇivotopis cˇasnika Stjepana Duic´a (II.)’, Politicˇki
zatvorenik, no. 146, May 2009.
55 HDA, fond 1363, ‘Politicˇka situacija’ box 5.
56 Banac, National Question, 264.
57 HDA, Fond 1363 Politicˇka situacija’ box 5.
58 Ibid.
59 TNA, PRO/FO 371/6194.
Post-imperial and Post-war Violence in the South Slav Lands, 1917–1923 261
among these groups have been well documented.60 The e´migre´s of the Croatian
Committee and the Croatian Legion saw themselves as part of this ‘paramilitary
subculture’61 in central Europe, and it was as part of this potent subculture that they
saw their greatest chance of success. Moreover, like the ex-soldiers of the Freikorps
and the Heimwehr, the war veterans of the Croatian Committee believed that defeat
and collapse in war could be redeemed through violence and resistance to the new
order.
The regional context
Having considered the various paths of soldiers, officers and peasants out of empire
and into Yugoslavia, it is now possible to integrate this interpretation of violence,
revolution and counter-revolution in Croatia into a regional framework. Clearly, the
violence and unrest in the region during 1917–1923 belong in a central European
context,62 the demise of Austro-Hungarian authority from the beginning of 1918
onwards impacting also on Hungary, Austria, Transylvania, the Bohemian lands
and so on. Rural unrest was also present in Hungary and in Germany during the
period. The crucial role of ‘returnee’ soldiers from Russia in the nascent Communist
Party of Yugoslavia points to a more general regional phenomenon;63 indeed, one
such returnee, Be´la Kun, was able to install (briefly) a revolutionary regime in
Hungary, an achievement which Yugoslav communists unsuccessfully attempted
to emulate, as we have seen. The e´migre´ ex-officers who gravitated towards the
Croatian Legion saw themselves as part of the European counter-revolution after
1918, the ‘White International’ responsible for so much paramilitary violence during
the period. Unlike their counterparts in Hungary, Austria and Germany, however,
they lacked the numbers and the political support to become a real force. The Croatian
counter-revolution relied on the support of larger paramilitary groups and foreign
political sponsorship (most importantly Italy), and counted on an as yet unproven
revolutionary mood among the people in Croatia. In fact, the e´migre´ officers were
in a minority already, thanks to the (qualified) success of the new Yugoslav army in
integrating ex-Habsburg officers into its ranks. Many career soldiers were willing to
swap the Habsburg double-headed eagle for that of Karaąorąevic´, leaving behind a
smaller group of unreconciled officers such as Duic´ and Sarkotic´.64
60 The Interior Ministry in Belgrade reported that a number of former officers of Croatian descent were
receiving food and equipment from Budapest, and that Andrassy planned to use Croatian officers
in an attempt to restore Charles to the throne in Hungary. See Mira Kolar Dimitrijevic´, ‘Lomljene
visˇestoljetnih veza izmeąu Hrvatske i Maąarske nakon prvog svjetskog rata’, Historijski zbornik, 47
(1995), 134–5.
61 Robert Gerwarth, ‘The Central European Counter-Revolution: Paramilitary Violence in Germany,
Austria, and Hungary after the Great War’, Past and Present, 200 (August 2008), 198.
62 The definition of central Europe and the categories of revolution in the following discussion are taken
from Tibor Hajdu, ‘Socialist Revolution in Central Europe, 1917–1921’, in Roy Porter and Mikula´sˇ
Teich, eds., Revolution in History (Cambridge University Press, 1986), 101–19.
63 Kiraly, War and Society.
64 On the process of creating a Yugoslav army after the war see Mile Bjelajac, Vojska kraljevine Srba, Hrvata,
i Slovenaca 1918–1921 (Belgrade: Narodna knjiga, 1988). See also Hrvoje Cˇapo, ‘Broj primljenih cˇasnika
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This last point starts to answer the question as to why there was no Red/White
convulsion here as there was in other parts of central Europe. A socialist revolution,
such as that which established the Hungarian Soviet, must have seemed more likely.
Communism after 1918 had electoral support in important urban centres, including
Zagreb and Belgrade (although communist mandates were quickly annulled in these
municipalities), and mass support, of a kind, in Macedonia and Montenegro.65 Pro-
fessional revolutionaries returning from Russia could have tapped into the discontent
and anti-war sentiment among the Croatian peasantry just as the Bolsheviks had done
in Russia; this too would have made them a force to be reckoned with.
There are two important reasons why the communists failed in Croatia where
their comrades in Hungary and Germany had succeeded. Firstly, and crucially, was
the unexpected transformation of the Croatian People’s Peasant Party, under Stjepan
Radic´, from a small faction in the Sabor into a mass movement, a transformation
which was all but complete by the time of the 1923 national elections in Yugoslavia.66
Crucially, Radic´’s programme of agrarian populism, which enjoyed the complete
support of the Croatian peasantry until his death in 1928, rejected any kind of
revolutionary move against the authorities. Although Radic´ came to reject (like the
communists) the centralised Yugoslav state and was extremely critical of the Serbian
army’s presence in Croatia, his trenchant anti-militarism (a tenet of his programme
which he claimed was informed by the unhappy experience of Croatian soldiers
during the war) prohibited any potentially violent uprising. As he himself put it,
talking about the October Revolution,
There were more than 100,000 of our people in Russia, and they saw what the greatest world
revolution really was. They understood its spirit, namely, that a free peasantry be created. They
supported this spirit of freedom, but they condemned the methods.67
The mass appeal of Radic´’s Peasant Party cut the communists off from grass-roots
support in the countryside, support that they would have needed to take power.
Closer study of the reasons for the popularity of communism in Yugoslavia at the
end of the First World War can also help to explain its failure to gain a foothold
in Croatia. The communists’ biggest electoral successes in the elections to the
Constituent Assembly in November 1920 were in Macedonia and Montenegro. But
in these regions, it seems, communist strength was due more to protest voting against
the new regime than to ideological affinity and support for socialist revolution. But
there was no Radic´ or any popular peasant movement in these regions. Anti-regime
voters had nowhere else to turn, whereas in Croatia Radic´’s defiant attitude towards
Belgrade provided an outlet for ex-soldiers and peasants whose impulse was to resist
central authority.
bivsˇe austrougarske vojske u vojsku Kraljevine Srba, Hrvata i Slovenaca’, Cˇasopis za suvremenu povijest,
3 (2008), 1087–103.
65 On the electoral strength of the communists in Yugoslavia in the elections of November 1920, see
Banac, National Question, 331.
66 On Radic´ and the Peasant Party see Mark Biondich, Stjepan Radic´, the Croat Peasant Party, and the
Politics of Mass Mobilization, 1904–1928 (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 2000).
67 Cited in ibid., 160.
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There still remains the striking contrast between Hungary’s brief Bolshevik
revolution and Croatia’s national/pacifist turn. Why did Hungarian returnees from
Russia find the idea of a socialist revolution more palatable than their Croatian
counterparts? Of course, Hungary lacked a popular agrarian movement akin to that
of the Croatian Peasant Party. Whether the existence of such a movement would have
altered the course of Hungary’s post-war history is a matter of speculation. Tibor
Hajdu, in his comparative study of central European socialist revolutions during 1917–
23, has noted the dominant role played by Vienna and Budapest in the Austrian and
Hungarian cases.68 Miklo´s Horthy himself acknowledged the importance of ‘sinful
Budapest’ in directing the Hungarian Bolshevik revolution. The same relationship
of dominance and suppression did not exist between Zagreb and the Croatian
countryside. On the contrary, the latter led the former, as the history of the National
Council shows. The popularity of communism in Zagreb was eclipsed by the peasant
movement in the countryside.
Furthermore, the communists were almost eradicated by extremely effective
policing and legal measures taken against them in the period immediately after the
war. The fear of a ‘red wave’ coming from revolutionary Russia, as well as a more
general sense that unification was under threat in the years after 1918, helped pass the
Obznana (Decree) restricting the activities of the Communist Party of Yugoslavia.
The communists themselves then provoked ‘The Law for the Protection of the
State’ (Zakon Zasˇtite drzˇave, ZZD) which criminalised the party altogether, after they
assassinated a former interior minister Milorad Drasˇkovic´ (1921). Drasˇkovic´, killed by
a young communist from Bosnia named Alija Alijagic´, was targeted since he had been
instrumental in enforcing the Obznana. The success of the anti-communist legislation
can be measured by looking at the party’s membership numbers, which declined from
80,000 in December 1920 to just 688 in December 1923, and never rose above 3,500
for the rest of the decade.69 As Christian Axboe Nielson has noted, the Obznana
and the ZZD set important precedents for the heavily policed dictatorship of King
Alexander (from 1929 until 1934),70 and the communists and Yugoslav authorities
fought a twilight battle against each other for the rest of the inter-war period.71
Conclusion: Yugoslavia after 1923 – a peaceable kingdom?
Did the period 1917–23mark the beginning and the end of the violence and resistance
associated with the demise of the empire and the transition of the region into a
nation-state? It certainly seems that the combination of factors examined in this
article contributed to establishing the centralised Yugoslav state of the 1920s. The
preponderant force of the Serbian army suppressed a countryside disorder whose key
68 Hajdu, ‘Socialist Revolution’, 111.
69 Ivan Avakumovic´, History of the Communist Party of Yugoslavia (Aberdeen University Press, 1964), 185.
70 Christian Axboe Nielson, ‘Policing Yugoslavism: Surveillance, Denunciations, and Ideology during
King Aleksandar’s Dictatorship, 1929–1934’, East European Politics and Societies, 23, 1 (2009), 36–7.
71 For a first-hand account of this battle see Milovan -Dilas, Memoir of a Revolutionary (New York:
Harcourt Brace Jovanovich, 1973).
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reason for protest became moot once the war ended. Radic´’s programme of pacifist
resistance dampened further chances of unrest and also cut communists adrift from
their vision of a popular revolution. Legislation designed to marginalise anti-Yugoslav
or radical political organisations drove this movement underground. Finally, the
passing of the high-water mark of counter-revolution in central Europe extinguished
the chances of a paramilitary group of ex-officers too small to act alone with any
chance of success, and the integration of career officers into the new army deprived
the movement of more manpower. To all extents and purposes, violent resistance was
pushed to the very fringes by the end of our period.
However, Yugoslavia was to experience some aftershocks of its own, which
changed the fortunes of some of these groups. In 1928, following a heated dispute
in the national parliament, a Montenegrin deputy named Punisˇa Racˇic´, a veteran
of the First World War, shot at deputies of the Croatian Peasant Party, killing three,
including (eventually) Stjepan Radic´. The resulting anger in Croatia against the
regime in Belgrade shifted the centre of political gravity in the region and showed
that currents present in 1917–23 had been dormant rather than extinguished in the
interim. The anti-militarism and pacifism of the Croatian Peasant Party became more
qualified as the new leader, Vlatko Macˇek, provided for paramilitary units known as
the Civil Guard (Graąanska zasˇtita) and the Peasant Guard (Seljacˇka zasˇtita) to protect
its members at party meetings. These formations comprised mainly former Habsburg
officers.72
The instillation of King Aleksandar’s royal dictatorship at the beginning of
1929, promulgated following the months of parliamentary crisis brought on by the
assassinations, also revived the fortunes of the Frankists and their ex-officer supporters.
At some point during 1929 a leading Frankist named Ante Pavelic´ and an ex-Habsburg
officer named Gustav Percˇec formed the Insurgent-Croatian Revolutionary
Organisation (Ustasˇa-Hrvatska Revolucionarna Organizacija, UHRO, or simply the
Ustashe). Analyses of this movement which emphasise the dialectical relationship of its
violence with the terror and oppression of the dictatorship (especially in Croatia)73 are
at risk of ignoring its important pre-history before 1929. The small group of Frankists
and ex-Habsburg officers who comprised the nucleus of the post-1929 Ustashe had
pursued a radical course – one that did not exclude the use of violence or terrorism –
in order to gain Croatian independence from the very beginning of the 1920s. In
this sense, the Croatian Committee, with its paramilitary organisation, its ex-officer
composition and its transnational network of allies that were almost identical to
those of the Ustashe (Fascist Italy, Hungarian counter-revolutionaries, Macedonian
autonomists) is an important prototype for the Ustashe of the 1930s. The notion that
ex-Habsburg officers were gathering to form an anti-Yugoslav paramilitary formation
was a recurring concern of the authorities in the 1920s.74
72 Sabrina P. Ramet, ‘Vladko Macˇek and the Croatian Peasant Defence in the Kingdom of Yugoslavia’,
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73 See, e.g., James J. Sadkovich, ‘Terrorism in Croatia 1929–34’, East European Quarterly, 22, 1 (1988),
55–79.
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Even more striking for its eerie anticipation of Ustasha terrorism is the report
made by British intelligence in Austria and Yugoslavia in June 1922 concerning a
plot to assassinate King Aleksandar at his wedding celebrations. The British claimed
that the conspiracy involved the ‘Party of Independence’ (that is, the Croatian Party
of Right, the Frankists) and was directed by a ‘certain Hungarian Major, Stipetitch
[Vilim Stipetic´]. This man was the leader of the Croatian National Committee, which
functioned in Vienna in 1919, afterwards moving to Graz and finally to Budapest.’ The
intended assassin for this operation was not a Croat, but a Macedonian autonomist,
Marion Kilifarsky, recommended by the Bulgarian Macedonian Committee (Internal
Macedonian Revolutionary Organisation, or VMRO), ‘formerly a Comitadji’, but
now ‘an independent desperado’.75 In other words, in its conception the operation
foreshadowed the successful assassination of King Aleksander in Marseille in October
1934, an action conceived and planned by Croatian separatists, but executed by a
Macedonian gunman, leased to the Ustashe by VRMO. Future research into the
Ustashe should not neglect the pre-1929 careers of the organisation’s Frankist and
ex-officer members, especially their activities during 1917–1923.
Finally, the remnants of the Communist Party of Yugoslavia were well placed to
endure the constraints of life under Aleksandar’s dictatorship. Because of the ZZD
they had been operating outside the law since 1921, and their tiny membership
had become habituated to surveillance and suppression by the state. Joined in
mutual opposition to the dictatorship, the communists actually formed a tactical
alliance with the Ustashe, making a distinction between the ‘fascist character’ of the
movement’s leadership, and the ‘progressive national-revolutionary character’ of their
few followers among the peasantry.76 It was a partnership which held until the late
1930s, but was long forgotten by most by the time the communists faced the Ustashe
in the Yugoslav Civil War of 1941–5.
The relatively less intense post-war, post-imperial violence in this region should
not lead to the conclusion that the transition from empire to nation-state was, with a
few hiccups, ultimately successful. Clearly, many of the groups examined in this article
were not reconciled to the new order during 1917–23, but were rather marginalised,
often through the use of force. These marginalised groups nevertheless remained
present throughout the inter-war period and were frequently able to undermine
Yugoslavia, especially in the 1930s. In order to understand the trajectory of inter-war
Yugoslavia, it is better not to ignore the transformations and violence of 1917–23.
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